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The Global Expansion of Constitutional Judicial Review:  
Some historical and comparative perspectives 
 
Albert H.Y. Chen
∗
 
 
Once a written constitution has been enacted as the supreme law of the land, the 
question arises as regards how to ensure that its promises can be translated into 
reality. There is a world of difference between a paper constitution that is merely 
nominal or semantic (Loewenstein 1957: 147-153), and a normative constitution 
that really achieves its intended objectives of constraining and regulating the 
exercise of political power and securing the enjoyment of human rights. The 
challenge is one of institutional design: what kind of political and legal structures 
should be put in place for the purpose of ensuring that the provisions of the 
constitution will be actually put into practice, preventing or minimizing breaches 
of such provisions, and providing effective sanctions for such breaches.  
 
From the perspective of legal positivism, one of the defining characteristics of 
law is the existence of sanctions for violations of legal norms. There is a 
difference in this regard between the enforcement of ordinary law and the 
enforcement of the constitution. In the case of ordinary law, litigation followed by 
a judgment rendered by a court is the main means for its enforcement when 
disputes arise or crimes are committed. In the course of the development of 
constitutional law which is intended to bind the political organs of the state, 
sometimes no clear sanctions are available even if the government acts in breach 
of a constitutional norm. That is why early legal positivists like John Austin 
consider constitutional law – as well as public international law – to be rules of 
political morality rather than law properly so called.  
 
Modern constitutional law has developed various means of ‘controls of 
constitutionality’ – means of supervising and guaranteeing the effective 
implementation of the provisions of the constitution. Cappelletti (1971) draws a 
distinction between political and judicial controls of constitutionality. Political 
controls are exercised by political or non-judicial organs of the state. Judicial 
control of constitutionality, or Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in German, is exercised 
by the judiciary. The principal means of judicial control of constitutionality is 
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judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation enacted by Parliament, or 
constitutional judicial review.   
 
In the modern world history of constitutionalism, two well-known models of 
constitutional judicial review have been developed. They are what is commonly 
known as the American model of ‘decentralised’ review by ordinary courts, and 
the Continental European model of ‘centralised’ review by a specialized 
constitutional court. There also exist mixed or hybrid systems which contain 
features of both the American and European models. Systems of constitutional 
judicial review also differ in terms of the extent to which the system provides for 
a stronger or weaker form of judicial review. These different models, structures 
and forms of constitutional judicial review will be introduced in this chapter with 
reference to the historical contexts in which they have evolved, their modes of 
operation and their underlying rationales. 
 
The American model of constitutional judicial review is usually traced back to the 
legendary decision of the US Supreme Court in Marbury v Madison,
1
 although 
there is a close relationship between this American system and British colonial 
constitutional law. In his famous judgment in this case, Chief Justice Marshall 
pointed out that the power of the legislature is limited by the constitution that has 
been established by the people; any law made by the legislature that is repugnant 
to the constitution is void; and it is the power and responsibility of the court to 
determine what is the applicable legal norm in a particular case where there is a 
conflict between a statute and the constitution. In the American system of 
constitutional judicial review that has evolved since Marbury v Madison, every 
court has the power to review whether a statutory provision is unconstitutional 
and therefore void. Standing at the apex of the hierarchy of courts, the US 
Supreme Court is the final court of appeal in deciding whether any statutory 
provision is inconsistent with the federal constitution of the USA.  
 
Britain does not have a written constitution, and there is therefore no practice of 
constitutional judicial review.
2
 However, colonies in the British Empire had 
written constitutions which were enacted by the Crown or Parliament in Britain. 
                                                        
1
 1 Cranch 137 (1803).  
2
 However, under the law of the European Communities (now the European Union), British courts and 
the European Court of Justice may review and invalidate UK law that is inconsistent with applicable 
European law. Under the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human 
Rights may review the compatibility of UK law with the Convention. After the enactment by the 
British Parliament of the Human Rights Act 1998, the highest courts in the UK may also review the 
compatibility of UK law with the Convention (as incorporated into the Act), though they may not 
invalidate such incompatible law.   
3 
 
Under British colonial law, colonial courts had the power to review whether any 
provision in an enactment of the colonial legislature was ultra vires the colonial 
constitution and therefore void. This colonial tradition of constitutional judicial 
review was inherited by Commonwealth countries such as Canada and Australia. 
The written constitutions of both Canada and Australia provide for a federal 
system characterized by a constitutionally entrenched division of power between 
the federal government and the provincial or state governments. Thus 
constitutional judicial review in these jurisdictions has been mainly concerned 
with the enforcement of this federal division of power, until Canada in 1982 
enacted, by way of constitutional amendment, the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, which inaugurated in Canada the era of constitutional judicial review 
in the domain of human rights protection. Constitutional judicial review by 
ordinary courts is also practised to varying extents in newly independent 
countries which were formerly parts of the British Empire, such as India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and some other common law countries in Asia and Africa, 
such as Malaysia and Kenya.  
 
The European model of constitutional judicial review by a specialized 
constitutional court can be traced back to the Austrian constitution of 1920, which, 
under the influence of Hans Kelsen’s jurisprudence, established a constitutional 
court (Cappelletti 46-7, 71-2). According to Kelsen’s theory of the hierarchy of 
legal norms, the constitution stands at the foundational level, and the validity of 
all legal norms in a state is ultimately derived from the constitution. Kelsen 
proposed the creation of a constitutional court which (unlike the ordinary courts) 
has jurisdiction to determine whether any legal norm is consistent with the 
constitution. In his view, the constitutional court is the complement to the 
legislature; it performs a political and legislative function – that of negative 
legislation, or nullification of an unconstitutional norm. In Kelsen’s theory, such 
constitutional judicial review is limited to dealing with logical inconsistencies 
between, on the one hand, constitutional norms – particularly norms governing 
the division of power between various state organs – and, on the other hand, other 
lower-level legal norms; it is not concerned with the protection of individuals’ 
human rights.
3
   
 
In addition to the constitutional court established under the Austrian constitution 
of 1920, constitutional review was also established in Czechoslovakia in 1920, in 
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Lichtenstein in 1921, and in Spain in 1931.
4
 In Ireland, the 1937 constitution 
expressly provided for judicial review of legislation.
5
 The Austrian constitutional 
court (Verfassungsgericht) epitomised the ‘archetypal form’ (Cappelletti 69) of 
the kind of constitutional judicial review that is (a) centralized, (b) abstract 
review (i.e. review of the constitutionality of a law but not in the context of the 
facts and circumstances of any concrete case that is litigated before an ordinary 
court (as distinguished from a constitutional court)) rather than concrete review 
(as in the American system or the systems in former British colonies, under which 
the court reviews the constitutionality of a law only where the application of that 
law is relevant to a case litigated before the court), and (c) review ‘principaliter’ 
(i.e. review in a legal action where the principal or only issue is the 
constitutionality of a law) rather than review ‘incidenter’ (as in the American 
system or the systems in former British colonies, where the review is only 
incidental to the making of a judicial decision as to which party wins the litigated 
case) (Cappelletti 69). In the Austrian system that existed in 1920-1929, the 
constitutional court only conducted abstract review of the constitutionality of 
laws in actions initiated by other governmental organs for the purpose of such 
review. In particular, the federal executive could request review of laws of the 
Länder (constituent states of the federation); the governments of the Länder could 
request review of federal legislation (Cappelletti 72). Hence the purpose of the 
system was to police the constitutional division of power between the federation 
and its member states. The Austrian system was modified by the constitutional 
amendment of 1929, under which the supreme court and central administrative 
court acquired the right to refer the question of the constitutionality of a law to 
the constitutional court when such a question arose in cases being tried by them 
(Cappelletti 72-4). Thus an element of concrete review or review incidenter was 
introduced into the Austrian system of centralized review by a constitutional 
court.  
 
Before the Second World War, attempts by ordinary courts in Germany and 
France to practise the American system of constitutional review were made but 
did not prove to be successful. In France, ‘[i]n a few cases the Conseil d’Etat or 
the Cour de Cassation seemed to avoid giving effect to an unconstitutional law by 
interpreting it so as to bring it within constitutional limits; but there was no case 
in which either the Conseil d’Etat or the Cour formally declared a law 
unconstitutional.’ (Favoreu 1990: 43) In Germany, the Weimar constitution of 
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1919 contained a bill of rights, but was silent on whether the courts could 
exercise the power of constitutional review of laws. ‘During the 1920s, several 
German courts, including the Supreme Court (the Reichsgericht) suggested that 
they had power to review the constitutionality of laws.’ (Jackson and Tushnet 
2006: 528) There also existed the Staatsgerichtshof, a constitutional tribunal that 
resolved inter-governmental disputes between the Länder (states) of Germany and 
between a state and the central government. This tribunal also had jurisdiction 
over impeachment of senior officials. (Jackson and Tushnet 527)  
 
The lack of progress of American-style constitutional review in Continental 
Europe before the Second World War has been attributed to several factors. 
(Favoreu 44-5) First, the European conception of law had been much influenced 
by Rousseau’s idea of law as the expression of general will; the law enacted by 
Parliament was therefore supreme. Secondly, European judges were skilled 
mainly in the technical application of legal rules, and were not prepared to 
exercise the ‘value-oriented, quasi-political functions involved in judicial review.’ 
(Favoreu 45) Thirdly, the organization of the court systems in European countries, 
particularly the plurality of courts specializing in different subject-matters and the 
lack of a single supreme court for all matters, was not conducive to the 
development of American-style judicial review. Finally, the supremacy of the 
constitution was not completely established in some European countries. For 
example, in Weimar Germany, a law enacted by the Reichstag by a two-thirds 
majority would be valid even if it appeared to be inconsistent with the 
constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights: thus the constitution could 
effectively be amended without an express constitutional amendment. (Jackson 
and Tushnet 526; Favoreu 46)   
 
In Latin America, the influence of the American system of constitutional review 
was considerable. Brewer-Carias (1989: 128) has pointed out that there is no 
necessary connection between a legal system based on the common law and the 
American system of decentralized constitutional review;
6
 nor is there a necessary 
                                                        
6
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functions of constitutional justice to a special Constitutional Court, Tribunal or Council … It may also 
exist when constitutional justice functions are attributed to the existing Supreme Court of the 
country, …’  
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connection between a civil law-based legal system and the Austrian model of 
centralized review by a constitutional court. Thus some civil law countries in 
Latin America, including Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, have adopted the 
American system of constitutional review (Brewer-Carias 128). At the same time, 
a hybrid system of constitutional judicial review, in which ‘the ordinary courts 
may have power to refuse to apply an unconstitutional law, but only a single court 
has the power to declare a law invalid,’ (Jackson and Tushnet 466) evolved in the 
course of the 19
th
 century in some Latin American countries, including Venezuela 
and Columbia (Brewer-Carias 128, 130). By the early 21
st
 century, there are 10 
Latin American countries in which the Supreme Court has the power to declare a 
law unconstitutional and to annul it; in 5 of these 10 countries, there exists a 
special constitutional chamber in the Supreme Court.
7
 In 6 other Latin American 
countries, the power of constitutional review is exercised by a specialized 
constitutional court.
8
 For example, since the 1970s, constitutional courts or 
‘constitutional guarantees tribunals’ have been established in Chile, Ecuador and 
Peru.
9
 In Argentina and Brazil, a lower court’s decision may be brought before 
the Supreme Court for review by an ‘extraordinary recourse of 
unconstitutionality’ (Brewer-Carias 129). 
 
After the Second World War, major developments in constitutional judicial 
review occurred in Europe. These developments may be understood in the 
context of the post-War international movement to enhance the protection of 
human rights, including the adoption by the United Nations of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the signature of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1950 by member 
states of the Council of Europe. Both the Basic Law (1949) of West Germany and 
the new Constitution (1947) of Italy provide for the establishment of 
constitutional courts, which started to operate in these countries in 1951 and 1956 
respectively. In France, the Constitution (1958) of the Fifth Republic provides for 
a constitutional council. Constitutional courts were established in Spain and 
Portugal in 1978 and 1982 respectively after their transition to democracy. Poland 
also established a constitutional court in 1985. Another wave of founding of 
constitutional courts followed the collapse of communism in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. Since the early 1990s, constitutional courts have been 
established in most of the new democracies in Russia, Eastern and Central Europe. 
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By the early 21
st
 century, constitutional courts exist in 18 of the 27 member states 
of the European Union, while American-style constitutional judicial review exists 
in Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland. Ireland, Greece, Cyprus and 
Estonia have hybrid systems of constitutional review (Comella 154). The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom are exceptional in the sense that they do not 
have a formal mechanism of constitutional review. However, under the Human 
Rights Act 1998, UK courts may declare the incompatibility of statutory 
provisions with the European Convention on Human Rights, though they have no 
power to invalidate such provisions. Dutch courts may review whether legislation 
is inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights, and to strike 
down statutory provisions that are so inconsistent (Koopmans 44).    
 
From its European and American roots, constitutional judicial review has grown 
and spread to all parts of the world, and is now clearly a global phenomenon. The 
institution of constitutional review by ordinary courts is widespread among 
common law jurisdictions, including former constituents of the British Empire 
and the Philippines, and has also been introduced in post-War Japan. At the same 
time, constitutional courts have been established all over the world: the founding 
of such a court is a particularly clear demonstration that the country concerned 
has chosen the path of constitutional judicial review. Examples of countries 
outside the European and American continents which have established 
constitutional courts include Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Taiwan (Republic of 
China), Mongolia, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. It is no coincidence that 
some of these courts were established in the 1980s (in South Korea), 1990s (in 
Mongolia, South Africa and Thailand) or the first decade of the 21
st
 century (in 
Indonesia) at the same time as the transition of their countries from 
authoritarianism to liberal constitutional democracy, which was also the case in 
European countries that have undergone such a transition. This shows that in the 
early 21
st
 century world, a well-developed system of constitutional review is now 
generally accepted as an essential or desirable feature of a liberal constitutional 
democracy.  
 
Some explanations have been provided by scholars as regards why many 
European states and new democracies in other parts of the world chose to 
establish specialized constitutional courts instead of adopting American-style 
constitutional review by ordinary courts. In the case of the civil law jurisdictions 
in Continental Europe, factors which have favoured the option of having a 
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constitutional court include the following:
10
 (a) the traditional conception of 
separation of powers according to which the judiciary (of the ordinary courts) 
should not engage in the ‘political’ function of invalidating Acts of Parliament; (b) 
the absence of a doctrine of stare decisis (binding precedents) in civil law 
countries, which means that even if one court rules that a statute is 
unconstitutional, the ruling does not bind other courts; (c) the structure (such as 
the plurality of courts specializing in different kinds of litigation), procedure, and 
mentality and training of judges of ordinary courts are such that they may not be 
effective in performing the task of constitutional review. In the case of countries 
undergoing a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, existing judges 
‘would be unlikely to have either the training or the independence from prior 
regimes to function with legitimacy as constitutional adjudicators’; hence the 
more viable option is to establish a constitutional court staffed by ‘a small 
number of respected and untainted jurists.’ (Jackson and Tushnet 468)  
 
Constitutional courts are often given additional functions other than the review of 
the constitutionality of laws, such as supervising elections and referenda, 
determining the legality of political parties, or enforcing the criminal law against 
senior officials (Comella 6). In the following, the operation of constitutional 
courts and of decentralized American-style constitutional review will be 
illustrated with reference to the experience in several countries whose models of 
constitutional adjudication are widely known and influential. We first consider 
the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, or BVerG), 
originally of West Germany, and subsequently of the united Germany (after 
1990).
11
 The court consists of 16 judges divided into two chambers or senates. 
Half of the judges are elected by the Bundestag (Federal Parliament), and the 
other half by the Bundesrat (Council of Constituent States).
12
 The types of cases 
over which the court has jurisdiction include, among others, (a) abstract review 
(upon the request of certain governmental actors, such as the federal government, 
a state government, or one-third of the members of the Bundestag); (b) concrete 
review, which means that other courts may, in the course of hearing cases, refer to 
the Constitutional Court a question regarding whether a statutory provision is 
unconstitutional; (c) constitutional complaints (Verfassungsbeschwerde)
13
 by 
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persons who allege that their basic rights have been violated by governmental 
actions, including administrative actions and judicial decisions. In practice most 
of the cases dealt with by the Court arose from constitutional complaints, and 
most of such complaints were against decisions of other courts. It has been 
pointed out that the institution of constitutional complaints has contributed to the 
high standing of the Constitutional Court in the eyes of members of the public, 
and to the ‘rising constitutional consciousness among Germans generally’ 
(Kommers 28). Apart from exercising the power of constitutional review of laws 
and governmental actions, the Constitutional Court also exercises other powers 
conferred upon it by the Basic Law and other laws, including the jurisdiction ‘to 
review cases involving the election of members to Parliament; to decide cases 
brought against the President of the Republic; to adjudicate controversies 
between constitutional organs, and between the Federal Republic and the Länder, 
or between two Länder’ (Favoreu 52).   
 
The constitutional courts in Italy and Spain share much in common with the 
German constitutional court. The Italian court consists of 15 judges; Parliament, 
the President and the judiciary each elects or appoints one-third of them. It has 
jurisdiction ‘over conflicts of jurisdiction between various state authorities and 
between regions; over allegations against the President of the Republic, the 
President of the Council of Ministers, and the ministers; the acceptance of 
abrogative referendums; and constitutional review of laws’ (Favoreu 52-3) 
(including concrete review upon reference by other courts). The Spanish 
constitutional court, which began to function in 1980, has 12 judges appointed by 
the king, 4 of whom upon nomination by the Congress, 4 by the Senate, 2 by the 
government, and 2 by the judiciary. Its jurisdiction includes the resolution of 
conflicts between state organs, the review of the legality of treaties, the review of 
the constitutionality of laws (including abstract review upon reference by the 
President, 50 members of the Congress or of the Senate, etc., and concrete review 
upon reference by a court in the course of litigation), and dealing with 
individuals’ petitions of amparo against administrative acts and judicial decisions 
that affect their fundamental rights (Favoreu 54). The writ of amparo was first 
developed in Latin America, and provides a channel of access to the 
constitutional court similar to the constitutional complaint in the German system.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
subject to exceptions), this remedy can only be pursued when other judicial remedies have been 
exhausted. The jurisdiction to hear constitutional complaints was not provided in the original Basic 
Law of 1949 but was first introduced by statute in 1951 and then given constitutional status by the 
constitutional amendment of 1969. 
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It has been pointed out that the operation of European-style constitutional courts 
is such that there is a trend towards convergence with the American model of 
constitutional review.
14
 First, the appointment or election of judges of European 
constitutional courts is a political process, with the political inclinations of 
nominees being taken into account. In the US, the President’s nominees for 
appointment to the Supreme Court need to be confirmed by Senate, which is also 
a political process. In practice, more than one-fifth of the nominees have been 
rejected by Senate.
15
 Secondly, although the US Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
to hear appeals in all types of cases, in practice constitutional law has become the 
most important part of its caseload, and thus it performs a function fairly similar 
to a constitutional court. Thirdly, the US Supreme Court can, by the system of 
grant or denial of certiorari, select which cases appealed to it from lower courts 
will be heard by it. Similarly, in the European system, many cases are screened 
out of the system at a preliminary stage and will not be considered by the 
constitutional court itself (Dorsen 170). Fourthly, there exist some similarities in 
terms of the techniques of constitutional interpretation used by, and the remedies 
granted by, the European constitutional courts and the American courts exercising 
the power of constitutional review. Finally, the involvement of European 
constitutional courts in concrete review and individuals’ constitutional complaints 
(which are mainly directed against judicial decisions and administrative actions) 
means that they are now not primarily concerned with abstract review
16
 – the 
original function of the Austrian model of constitutional court – but are heavily 
involved in ‘microconstitutional review’ (Favoreu 54). In this regard, their 
function has become more similar to that of the American Supreme Court as the 
final appellate court for cases decided by lower courts.   
 
Apart from the convergence between the American and European systems of 
constitutional review, the move towards convergence between the French system 
and the ‘mainstream’ European system (as represented by Germany, Italy and 
Spain) is also noteworthy and demonstrates the increasing appeal of making 
constitutional justice more widely available to people. Since the French 
Revolution, the French conception of the nature of legislation (as expressing the 
‘general will’) and the supremacy of Parliament was such that courts did not have 
any power to review the constitutionality of or to strike down laws enacted by 
Parliament. The 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic established for the first 
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time a constitutional council (Conseil Constitutionnel). This constitution departed 
from the approach of the 1946 constitution and established a strong executive 
with some law-making powers. The original intent in establishing the 
constitutional council was to enable it to ensure that Parliament would not 
encroach upon the powers of the executive. The council consists of 9 members; 
the President, the chairman of the National Assembly and the chairman of the 
Senate each appoints one-third of the members.
17
 The council was given the 
power to review the constitutionality of bills adopted by Parliament before the 
bills came into effect as laws. This kind of review may be characterized as 
‘preventive’ (preventing an unconstitutional law from coming into force) or ‘a 
priori’ review (before the formal promulgation of a law) (Comella 7). Other 
subject-matters over which the council has jurisdiction include elections, 
emergency powers, and the constitutionality of treaties.
18
 The role of the 
constitutional council expanded significantly as a result of and since the council’s 
landmark decision in 1971 in the case of Liberté d’Association, ‘which can be 
called France’s Marbury v Madison’ (Pech 2004: 91). In this case, which was 
concerned with the freedom of association, the council asserted and exercised the 
power to declare a bill to be unconstitutional if it violates the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (of the year 1789), the Preamble to the 1946 
Constitution, or ‘the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the 
Republic.’ Since 1971, therefore, the constitutional council could use and has 
used its power of constitutional review not only to maintain the boundary 
between the powers of legislative and executive organs, but also to protect human 
rights. 1974 saw a further expansion of the council’s role. Before 1974, the right 
to request the council to review the constitutionality of bills was restricted to the 
President, the Prime Minister, and the chairman of each chamber of Parliament. 
The constitutional reform of 1974 empowered 60 members of either chamber to 
activate the council’s review jurisdiction.
19
 The practice thereby developed that 
almost every controversial bill would be referred to the council for review 
(Morton 1988: 90-2). However, the council’s power of review was still confined 
to abstract review, until the constitutional amendment of 2008 which introduced 
concrete review into the French system for the first time (Comella 8). Under this 
amendment, courts may, in the course of hearing cases, refer a law that is alleged 
to violate constitutional rights to the constitutional council, subject to a filtering 
process involving the two highest courts – the Cour de Cassation (Court of 
Cassation) and the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State, which is the highest 
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administrative court).  
 
In terms of the structure or organization of constitutional review, the main mode 
of classification of different systems is that based on the distinction discussed 
above between American-style decentralized review (which is also prevalent in 
other former British colonies) and European-style centralized review by a 
constitutional court. In terms of the form or manner of constitutional review, a 
possible distinction is that between what can be called a strong form of 
constitutional judicial review and a weak form. This distinction is based on the 
relative powers of and relationship between the court (which exercises the power 
of constitutional review) and the Parliament. Strong constitutional judicial review 
may be said to exist where the court’s determination that a particular law is 
unconstitutional is final and conclusive, and is binding on all person and organs 
until and unless the court overrules itself in another case, or a constitutional 
amendment is enacted which alters the constitutional rule on which the court’s 
original decision was based. Thus strong constitutional judicial review exists in 
both the USA and Germany, although they practise decentralized and centralized 
review respectively.  
 
On the other hand, weak constitutional judicial review exists where the court’s 
determination that a particular law is unconstitutional and invalid can be 
superseded or overridden by a subsequent Act of Parliament (which is not a 
constitutional amendment) that re-affirms this law by a special majority or even 
just a simple majority. The most well-known example of this weak form of 
constitutional judicial review is provided by the case of Canada under its 1982 
constitution, which provides for an ‘override’ mechanism.
20
 Under this 
mechanism, Parliament may (by a simple majority) validate a statute even if it is 
inconsistent with certain provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms as interpreted by the court. Such validation would automatically expire 
after 5 years unless it is extended. This ‘override’ mechanism is however not 
applicable to certain Charter rights that are considered to be essential to the 
democratic process.  
 
The system introduced in the UK by the Human Rights Act 1998 may be 
regarded as a form of constitutional judicial review (if we deem the Act to be part 
of the UK’s constitution) that is even weaker than the Canadian review, because 
the British court may only declare provisions in an Act of Parliament to be 
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inconsistent with the Act (and the European Convention on Human Rights) but 
has no power to invalidate the provisions. It will then be up to Parliament to 
decide whether, and if so how, the former Act is to be amended. The ‘preventive’ 
or ‘a priori’ review by the French constitutional council (which is applicable 
before a law is promulgated and does not therefore involve the invalidation of any 
law that has come into force), and the ‘consultative’ review (Cappelletti 2) or 
advisory or reference jurisdiction (in the form of the Supreme Court – upon 
request by the government -- delivering an advisory opinion (which is not binding) 
on a constitutional question) that exists in Canada and India, may also be 
regarded as weak forms of constitutional judicial review.    
 
The strongest form of constitutional judicial review may be said to exist where 
the court has – or has successfully claimed -- the power to determine, in the final 
analysis, whether a constitutional amendment itself is constitutional and valid. 
For example, in the German Basic Law, the ‘eternity clause’ (article 79(3)) 
prohibits constitutional amendments ‘affecting the division of the Federation into 
Länder, the participation on principle of the Länder in legislation, or the basic 
principles laid down in articles 1 and 20’ of the Basic Law. The constitutional 
court is the ultimate authority for determining, in accordance with the provisions 
of the constitution including the ‘eternity clause,’ whether a constitutional 
amendment isvalid. In India, the Supreme Court has, in the famous Kesavananda 
Bharati case (in 1973) and subsequent cases, enunciated a doctrine that the ‘basic 
structure’ or the basic features of the constitution may not be validly amended, 
and has successfully asserted the power to determine, in accordance with this 
‘basic structure’ doctrine, whether particular constitutional amendments are valid 
(Krishnaswamy 2009; Ramachandran 2000). The constitutional court in Taiwan 
has asserted and exercised a similar power in 2000.
21
 The judicial review of the 
constitutionality of a constitutional amendment thus exemplifies constitutional 
judicial review in its strongest form.  
 
Constitutional judicial review, in most of the forms in which it has existed in 
history and in the contemporary world, involves the invalidation of provisions in 
Acts of Parliament by a court (such as the supreme court in a decentralized 
system of constitutional review or the constitutional court) on the ground that the 
provisions are unconstitutional. Insofar as the court consists of unelected and 
elitist judges whereas Parliament consists of the elected representatives of the 
                                                        
21
 The Council of Grand Justices’ Interpretation No. 499 (March 2000): see 
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional court. See also Yeh 2002: 59. 
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people, the institution of constitutional judicial review is apparently undemocratic 
or counter-majoritarian, and its legitimacy has thus been questioned from time to 
time (Bickel 1986). Some jurists defend it by explaining that it enables the values 
in natural law (as a higher law than positive law) to be realized in a legal system 
that is largely positivist (Cappelletti 1971); thus constitutional justice through 
constitutional judicial review contributes to the realization of justice, human 
dignity and human rights. Others point out that constitutional judicial review is 
necessary for the maintenance of the basic institutions, processes and conditions 
of a democratic polity;
22
 democracy or majoritarian rule itself cannot guarantee 
such maintenance. Furthermore, the rights of minorities need to be safeguarded 
by constitutional justice, as majoritarian rule may result in such rights being 
threatened.
23
 Some political scientists point out that in designing a constitutional 
system, it is rational for actors to choose to establish a system of constitutional 
justice, so that they themselves may avail of it should they lose in the election and 
become a minority in, or even absent from, the executive and legislative 
institutions (Ginsburg 2003). ‘[I]ndependent judicial review serves a valuable 
insurance function for competitors in a stable democracy.’ (Stephenson 2003: 85) 
Actually, in many countries in the contemporary world, the traditional conception 
of separation of three powers for the purpose of check and balance has lost much 
of its efficacy, because both the executive and legislature may, as a result of 
elections, fall under the control of the same political party or political force. In 
this scenario, the availability of the channel of constitutional judicial review – and 
the existence of an independent judiciary that administers constitutional justice -- 
as a check on the ruling power that dominates both the executive and legislature 
becomes all the more important and valuable (Koopmans 247-51, Favoreu 56). 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bell, John (1992) French Constitutional Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Bickel, Alexander M. (1986) The Least Dangerous Branch, 2
nd
 ed. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.  
 
Cappelletti, Maruo (1971) Judicial Review in the Contemporary World. 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.  
 
                                                        
22
 See, e.g., Ely (1980). 
23
 See, e.g., the famous footnote 4 of Justice Stone’s opinion in United States v Carolene Products Co 
(1938) 304 US 144. 
15 
 
Comella, Víctor Ferres (2009) Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: A 
European Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Dorsen, Norman, et al. (2010) Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and 
Materials, 2
nd
 ed. St Paul, MN: West.  
 
Ely, John Hart (1980) Democracy and Distrust. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
Favoreu, Louis (1990) ‘Constitutional Review in Europe’, in Louis Henkin and 
Albert J. Rosenthal eds., Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the 
United States Constitution Abroad, pp. 38-62. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Ginsburg, Tom (2003) Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional 
Cases in Asian Courts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Jackson, Vicki C. and Tushnet, Mark (2006) Comparative Constitutional Law, 2
nd
 
ed. New York: Foundation Press.  
  
Kelsen, Hans (1942) ‘Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the 
Austrian and the American Constitution’, 4 J. Pol. 183. 
 
Kelsen, Hans (1961) General Theory of Law and State, Anders Wedberg trans. 
New York: Russell.  
 
Kommers, Donald P. (1997) The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Durham: Duke University Press, 2
nd
 ed.  
 
Koopmans, Tim (2003) Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative View. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Krishnaswamy, Sudhir (2009) Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: A 
Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Loewenstein, Karl (1957) Political Power and the Government Process. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
16 
 
Morton, F.L. (1988) ‘Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis’, 36 Am. 
J. Comp. L. 89  
 
Pech, Laurent (2004) ‘Rule of Law in France’, in Randall Peerenboom ed., Asian 
Discourses of Rule of Law, pp. 79-112. London: Routledge.  
 
Ramachandran, Raju (2000) ‘The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure 
Doctrine’, in B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., Supreme But Not Infallible: Essays in 
Honour of the Supreme Court of India, pp. 107-133. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Stephenson, Matthew C. (2003) ‘When the Devil Turns …’: The Political 
Foundations of Independent Judicial Review’, 32 Journal of Legal Studies 59 
 
Sweet, Alec Stone (2000) Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in 
Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Yeh, Jiunn-Rong (2002) ‘Constitutional Reform and Democratization in Taiwan, 
1945-2000’, in Peter C.Y. Chow ed., Taiwan’s Modernization in Global 
Perspective, pp. 47-77. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.  
